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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
COLONIAL PACIFIC LEASING CORP.,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

Appellate Court No. 98-0062 CA
Priority No. 15

v.
J.W.C.J.R. CORPORATION, dba JACK'S
SOUTHWEST COLLISION REPAIR and
JOHN W. CUMBERLEDGE, JR.,
Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS J.W.C.J.R. CORPORATION ET AL.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Appellants appealfromafinalorder of the Third District Court, Salt Lake Department,
the Honorable William W. Barrett presiding, granting judgment in favor of appellee Colonial
Pacific Leasing Corporation. The instant appeal was commenced in the Utah Supreme Court,
with jurisdiction conferred upon that court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1997).
The Utah Supreme Court subsequently poured-over this case to the Utah Court of Appeals for
disposition pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) and § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1997).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue #1: Did the trial court err in concluding that appellants breached the subject lease

agreement with Colonial Pacific by failing to make payments under the lease, where the leased
computer equipment did not function properly, and where Colonial Pacific informed appellants
that the lease would be canceled if no payment statements were sent? STANDARD OF
REVIEW: The trial court's legal conclusions are reviewed de novo under the correction of error
standard of review, and this Court will accord no particular deference to the trial court's
conclusions. United Park Citv Mines Co. v. Greater Park Citv Co.. 870 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah
1993); State v. Pena. 869 R2d 932. 936 (Utah 1994V RECORD CITATION: This issue was
raised below in Appellant's Trial Brief and at pages 12-17, 50, 58-66, and 94-101 of the Record
(Trial Transcripts), and has therefore been preserved for appeal.

Issue #2: Did the trial court err in failing to conclude, as a matter of law, that there was
no acceptance of the leased computer equipment by appellants? STANDARD OF REVIEW:
The trial court's legal conclusions are reviewed de novo under the correction of error standard of
review, and this Court will accord no particular deference to the trial court's conclusions. United
Park Citv IVGnes Co. v. Greater Park Citv Co.. 870 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah 1993); State v. Pena, 869
P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). RECORD CITATION: This issue was raised below in Appellant's
Trial Brief and at pages 14-17, 58-66, and 95-96 of the Record.

Issue #3: Did the trial court err in failing to makefindingsas to whether appellants were
entitled to a thirty day trial period within which to test the leased computer equipment, and in
failing to conclude that a condition precedent to the legal effectiveness of the lease had not been
met? STANDARD OF REVIEW: Under the "correctness" or "correction of error" standard,
2

Utah appellate courts grant no particular deference to the trial court's rulings on questions of law,
and may review them in a de novo fashion on appeal. United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater
Park Citv Co.. 870 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah 1993); Statev.Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994).
RECORD CITATION: This issue was raised below in Appellant's Trial Brief and at pages 6066y 72, and 96 of the Record.

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
The following statutory authorities are either determinative in this appeal or are of such
central importance as to merit their inclusion herein:
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2a-515(l) (1997):
Acceptance of goods occurs after: (a) the lessee has had a reasonable
opportunity to inspect the goods and the lessee signifies or acts with respect
to the goods in a manner that signifies to the lessor or the supplier that the
goods are conforming or that the lessee will take or retain them in spite of
their nonconformity; or (b) the lessee fails to make an effective rejection of
the goods as provided in Subsection 70A-2a-509(2).
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2a-509(l), (2) (1997):
(1) Subject to the provisions of Section 70A-2a-510 on default in
installment lease contracts, if the goods or the tender or delivery fail in any
respect to conform to the lease contract, the lessee may reject or accept the
goods or accept any commercial unit or units and reject the rest of the
goods.
(2) Rejection of goods is ineffective unless it is within a reasonable time
after tender or delivery of the goods and the lessee seasonably notifies the
lessor.
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2a-103(l)(g) (1997):
"Finance lease" means a lease in which: (I) the lessor does not select,
3

manufacture, or supply the goods; (ii) the lessor acquires the goods or the
right to possession and use of the goods in connection with the lease; and
(iii) one of the following occurs:... (D) if the lease is not a consumer lease,
the lessor, before the lessee signs the lease contract, informs the lessee in
writing: (I) of the identity of the person supplying the goods to the lessor,
unless the lessee has selected that person and directed the lessor to acquire
the goods or the right to possession and use of the goodsfromthat person;
(IX) that the lessee is entitled under this chapter to the promises and
warranties, including those of any third party, provided to the lessor by the
person supplying the goods in connection with or as part of the contract by
which the lessor acquired the goods or the right to possession and use of the
goods; and (HI) that the lessee may communicate with the person supplying
the goods to the lessor and receive an accurate and complete statement of
those promises and warranties, including any disclaimer and limitations of
them or of remedies.
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2a-407 (1997):
(1) In the case of afinancelease that is not a consumer lease, the lessee's
promises under the lease contract become irrevocable and independent upon
the lessee's acceptance of the goods. (2) A promise that has become
irrevocable afld independent under Subsection (1): (a) is effective and
enforceable between the parties, and by or against third parties including
assignees of the parties; and (b) is not subject to cancellation, termination,
modification, repudiation, excuse, or substitution without the consent of the
party to whom the promise runs.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
This is an appealfroman order of the Third District Court, Salt Lake Department, the
Honorable William W. Barrett presiding, granting judgment against appellants in the amount of
$21,275.30 for breach of afinancelease agreement. Appellants, as lessees under the subject lease
agreement, bring this appeal challenging the trial court's legal conclusion that they were
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responsible for making payments under the lease even though the leased goods were nonconforming and were never accepted.

B. Course of the Proceedings and the Disposition Below
On February 4,1997, Colonial Pacific Leasing Corporation (hereinafter "Colonial
Pacific") commenced this action byfilinga complaint with the Third District Court, Salt Lake
Department, Division H A pretrial conference before Judge William W. Barrett was held on
March 24,1997, whereupon the court set the matter for trial on July 18,1997. On July 17,1997,
only one day before trial, Colonial Pacific filed an ex-parte motion to continue the trial date,
purportedly due to the unavailability of a witness. The trial court granted the motion to continue
and rescheduled the trial for September 29,1997. No hearing was held on the motion prior to the
court entering its decision. Appellant's counsel subsequently sought argument on the motion
before the trial court, which was granted. The trial court then upheld its decision to continue the
trial date.
A one day trial was held on September 29,1997, following which the court took the
matter under advisement. This appeal is takenfromthe trial court'sfinalOrder and Judgment
entered on December 30, 1997, granting judgment against appellants for breach of afinancelease.
No prior nor related appeals have been taken.

C. Statement of Facts
1.

On June 9,1993, J.W.C.J.R. Corporation entered into a lease contract with

Colonial Pacific for the lease of a 386 computer system and certain collision repair estimate
5

software. (Findings of Fact #1.)
2.

John W. Cumberledge, Jr., as owner of J.W.C.J.R., was required to sign a written

guarantee of the lease contract, which he did. On June 9, 1993, he was also asked to sign an
"Acknowledgement and Acceptance of Equipment by Lessee," even though he had not yet
received the leased goods. (Findings of Fact #2; Trial Transcripts ("T.T.") at 14,47, 58.)
3-

Sometime around June 10,1993, the leased goods were delivered and installed at

lessees' place of business by Bottomline Systems, Inc. (hereinafter "Bottomline"), but the
equipment did not function properly. (Findings of Fact #4; T.T. at 12, 58-60.)
4.

J.W.C J.R. and Cumberledge Jr. (collectively referred to hereinafter as "lessees")

were told by Bottomline that they would have a thirty day trial period within which to test the
leased equipment to ensure that it was operational and would meet their needs. (T.T. at 60, 62,
72.)
5.

Lessees informed Colonial Pacific on at least two occasions that the equipment

was not operational. (Findings of Fact #5; T.T. at 12, 58-59, 65-66, 70-71.)
6.

Despite repeated requests by lessees to have Bottomline examine the equipment,

lessees were unable to get Bottomline to make an inspection. As a result, lessees asked a business
associate, Alan Shupe, to attempt to get the equipment to operate. Shupe examined the
equipment but was unable to get the system to operate properly. (T.T. at 60-64, 65, 76-77.)
7.

Within three weeks after delivery of the leased goods, lessees boxed up the

equipment and returned it to Bottomline. (Findings of Fact #6; T.T. at 63-64, 72, 76-77.)
&

Lessees informed Colonial Pacific that the leased equipment was junk, and that it

had been returned to the supplier. They were told by a representative of Colonial Pacific that if
6

they did not receive a payment statement, that they could assume the lease was canceled. (T.T. at
17, 63-66.)
9.

Lessees never received a payment statementfromColonial Pacific, and assumed

the lease had been canceled. (T.T. at 63-71.)
10.

More than two years later, Colonial Pacific informed lessees that they were in

default under the subject lease agreement for failure to make payments under the lease. (T.T. at
16-17,43, 71.)
11.

Colonial Pacific subsequently accelerated all payments due under the lease, and

instituted legal proceedings against lessees for failure to pay for a 386 computer system that
lessees had for three weeks and could never get to operate properly. (T.T. at 21,63-64, 72, 7677.)
12.

Patty Bost, a representative of Colonial Pacific's legal department, testified that

although lessees' account had fallen into a "black hole," the lease was noncancellable. (T.T. at
17, 19, 50.)

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in concluding, as a matter of law, that lessees were responsible for
making payments to Colonial Pacific under the parties'financelease agreement. Pursuant to the
Utah Commercial Code, afinancelease becomes noncancellable only upon acceptance of the
leased goods by the lessee. In the instant case, no acceptance of the leased goods ever occurred.
The lessees had the equipment for about three weeks, and were never able to get it to function
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properly. The trial court's ownfindingsof fact evidence a lack of acceptance by the lessees.
Thesefindingssimply cannot be squared with the trial court's legal conclusions, which upheld the
validity of the lease under the Utah Commercial Code, requiring lessees to make payments to
make payments to Colonial Pacific despite their timely rejection. Inasmuch as the leased
equipment was nonconforming and never accepted by the lessees, the trial court's legal
conclusions are erroneous as a matter of law. This Court should therefore overturn the trial
court's decision.
This Court should also overturn the trial court's decision because Colonial Pacific failed to
satisfy a condition precedent to the legal effectiveness of the lease agreement. Lessees were
promised a thirty day trial period within which to test the leased computer equipment to ensure
that it was operational and would meet their needs. Lessees had the equipment for three weeks
but were never able to get it to operate. Consequently, they boxed up the equipment and returned
it to the supplier. They were then told by Colonial Pacific that if they did not receive a payment
statement, they could assume the lease was canceled. Lessees never received a payment
statement, nor did they have any other contact with Colonial Pacific for more than two years.
Clearly, the parties understood that a condition precedent to the legal effectiveness of the lease
had not been met, and that the lease had been timely canceled. The trial court erred in failing to
makefindingsregarding the failure of a condition precedent to the legal effectiveness of the lease,
and erred in concluding as a matter of law that lessees were required to make payments under the
lease.
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ARGUMENT
L

LESSEES NEVER ACCEPTED THE LEASED GOODS, BUT
INSTEAD TIMELY REJECTED THEM AS NONCONFORMING

The trial court erred in concluding that lessees were responsible for making payments to
Colonial Pacific under the parties'financelease agreement, because the leased goods were
nonconforming and were never accepted by the lessees. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2a407, a lessee's promise to make payments under afinancelease becomes irrevocable upon
acceptance of the leased goods. Thereafter, such a promise cannot be canceled nor repudiated
without the consent of the lessor. As the following discussion will demonstrate, lessees in the
instant case never accepted the leased goods, but instead timely rejected them as nonconforming.
Therefore, the trial court erred in concluding that lessees breached the subject lease agreement by
failing to make payments under the lease.

A*

The Trial Court's Legal Conclusions Cannot Be Reconciled with the
Court's Findings of Fact

The trial court's conclusions of law assume, without explicitly stating, that lessees
accepted the leased goods, and thus became irrevocably committed to making payments under the
lease. For example, the court's conclusion of law #1 provides: "The Defendants entered a valid
and binding lease contract with Plaintiff." Similarly, the court's conclusion of law #2 states: "The
lease contract is governed by the provisions of the Utah Commercial Code wherein it is
categorized as afinancelease." Finally, the court's conclusion of law #4 provides: "The
Defendants' failure to make payments to Plaintiff pursuant to thefinancelease constituted a
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breach of contract."1 These legal conclusions rest on the assumption that lessees accepted the
leased goods. Such an assumption, however, finds no support at all in the trial court'sfindingsof
fact. Instead, thosefindingsclearly demonstrate not only a lack of acceptance by lessees, but a
timely rejection of the leased goods.
The followingfindingsof fact were made by the Court on December 30,1997:
3.
Defendant J.W.CJ.R. used Plaintiffsfinancingto procure computer
equipmentfromBottomline Systems, Inc.
4.
The equipment was delivered and installed at Defendant J.W.C.J.R.'s
place of business by Bottomline Systems, Inc., but it did notfunction
properly.
5.
Defendant John Cumberledge informed Plaintiff on two occasions
that the equipment was not operational.
6.
The equipment was returned to Bottomline Systems, Inc. subsequent
to the signing and execution of thefinancelease.
7*
The Defendants were not contacted by Plaintiff until approximately
two years thereafter, at which time Plaintiff sought payment in full from
Defendants.
(Findings of Fact Nos. 3-7, December 30, 1997) (emphasis added). Taken together, these
findings clearly support the conclusion that lessees timely rejected the leased goods, and that both
parties understood the lease had been canceled. Lessees had the equipment for no more than
three weeks, and then promptly returned it to the supplier after they were unable to get the system
to operate properly. The trial court'sfindingssimply cannot be reconciled with the court's legal
conclusions, which upheld the validity of the lease despite the lessees' timely rejection. Lessees
x

The lease agreement itself states that any litigation regarding the validity and enforcement
of the lease would be governed by Oregon law, with jurisdiction residing in the State of Oregon.
(Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit #1, para. 7.) However, Colonial Pacific instituted this legal proceeding in
Utah, and both parties argued the case at trial under Utah law.
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respectfully submit that the trial court's legal conclusions are erroneous as a matter of law, and
ask this Court to reverse the trial court's decision and dismiss this matter with prejudice.

B.

The Evidence, when Marshaled, Compels the Conclusion that
Lessees Timely Rejected the Leased Goods

The central issue in this case is whether lessees accepted the leased goods, thus making
their promise to pay under the lease irrevocable. The term "acceptance of goods" is defined at
section 70A-2a-515(l) of the Utah Commercial Code, which provides:
Acceptance of goods occurs after:
(a) the lessee has had a reasonable opportunity to inspect the goods and the
lessee signifies or acts with respect to the goods in a manner that signifies to
the lessor or the supplier that the goods are conforming or that the lessee
will take or retain them in spite of their nonconformity; or
(b) the lessee fails to make an effective rejection of the goods as provided in
Subsection 70A-2a-509(2).
Pursuant to this definition, acceptance does not occur until after lessees have been given a
reasonable opportunity to make an inspection. What constitutes a "reasonable opportunity to
inspect" is generally left for the trier of fact to determine. Lish v. ComptoiL 547 P.2d 223 (Utah
1976); Cervitor Kitchens Inc. v. Chapman. 500 P.2d 783 (1972), afiPd 513 P.2d 25 (Wash. 1973).
A short duration of time might be appropriate in the case of perishable goods, whereas a longer
period would be appropriate for more complex and highly sophisticated machinery. Highland Rim
Constructors v. Atlantic Software Corp., 1992.TN.1470 (http://www.versuslaw.com) (concluding
buyer timely rejected defective computer equipment after thirty day trial period) (a copy of this
case is found in Appendix hereinafter). In the instant case, the evidence, when marshaled, clearly
demonstrates not only a lack of acceptance of the leased goods by the lessees, but an attempt by

11

Colonial Pacific to deny lessees of their right to make a reasonable inspection.
Only two items of evidence offered at trial can be marshaled in favor of afindingof
acceptance by the lessees. These items of evidence are set forth below:
(1)
Lessees signed a document entitled "Acknowledgement and Acceptance of
Equipment by Lessee." (Plaintiff9s Trial Exhibit #2.) The Acknowledgement states that lessees
have received the leased equipment, and acknowledge that the equipment has been properly
installed and inspected. The Acknowledgement further provides that the equipment is operating
properly in all respects, and states that: "Lessee hereby accepts unconditionally and irrevocably
the Equipment." (Id.)
(2)
Patty Bost, Colonial Pacific's litigation specialist, testified at trial that Colonial
Pacific called lessees on two occasions after the lease was signed. Thefirstcall occurred on June
10, 1993. The second call occurred the next day on June 11,1993, at which time Colonial Pacific
was told that the equipment was installed and operational, and that it was okay to start the lease.
(T.T. at 13; Plaintiffs Exhibit #3.)
Atfirstblush, these facts would appear to provide at least some evidentiary support for a legal
conclusion that lessees accepted the equipment. However, when these facts are scrutinized, such
a conclusion cannot possibly be reached.
First, it is undisputed that lessees signed the Acknowledgement before actually receiving
the leased equipment. Therefore, the assertions contained in the Acknowledgement are untrue on
their face. Unfortunately, it appears to be a standard business practice of Colonial Pacific to
encourage their customers to lie by signing the Acknowledgement before ever receiving delivery
of the leased goods. (T.T. at 14-15, 44-48; see also McNatt v. Colonial Pacific Leasing. 472
S.E.2d 435 (1996) (lessee under lease with Colonial Pacific pressured into signing
Acknowledgement in advance of actually receiving the equipment)). In any event, because lessees
signed the subject Acknowledgement before receiving the equipment, the Acknowledgement by
itself clearly provides an untenable basis for concluding that lessees accepted the equipment.
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Nor does the telephone conversation of June 11, 1993, fair any better. This conversation
occurred only two days after the lease agreement was signed, and only one day after lessees
informed Colonial Pacific that they were having problems getting the equipment to operate
properly. Again, under the Utah Commercial Code, acceptance does not occur until after lessees
have been given a reasonable opportunity to make an inspection. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2a515(1) (1997). In the instant case, Colonial Pacific provided lessees with only two days to make
an inspection. This period was unreasonably short, especially since Colonial Pacific had been
notified one day earlier that lessees were having problems with the equipment. In its rush to make
lessees irrevocably committed to making payments under the lease, Colonial Pacific has attempted
to deny lessees of their statutoryrightto a reasonable inspection. This Court should conclude
that two days did not provide lessees with a reasonable opportunity to inspect. This Court should
further conclude that after lessees were given a reasonable opportunity to inspect, they timely
rejected the leased goods. This conclusion is compelled by the following catalog of evidence:
(1)
Lessees received the equipment on or about June 10, 1993, one day after signing
the lease. That same day, lessees informed Colonial Pacific by telephone that the equipment was
not operational. Patty Bost testified: "We originally called [lessees] on June 10th. We spoke with
John Cumberiedge, he said that the equipment is delivered, that it was not all working yet and that
the vendor was coming out to work on it." (T.T. at 12-13; 58-59.)
(2)
Almost immediately after Colonial Pacific called on June 11, 1993, and was told
the equipment was functioning, the equipment seized up and would not operate nor do what it
was supposed to do. Lessees called Bottomline to have them check out the problem, but
Bottomline never showed up to make any repairs. (T.T. at 59-60.)
(3)
Lessees called Bottomline on numerous occasions thereafter, but were unable to
get a response. (T.T. at 62-63.)
(4)
Lessees understood they had thirty days within which to test the equipment to
ensure that it was operational. (T.T. at 60, 62, 72.)
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(5)
Due to Bottomline's lack of response, lessees brought in their own expert, Alan
Shupe, to look at the computer equipment. Shupe was unable to get the system to operate. He
made a phone call to Bottomline, but also received no response. (T.T. at 65, 76.)
(6)
Lessees immediately called Colonial Pacific to notify them of the trouble they were
having with the equipment. Lessees asked Colonial Pacific to put a stop on the lease. (T.T. at
63-64, 65-66.)
(7)
Lessees were told by a representative of Colonial Pacific that if they did not
receive a payment statement, that "no news was good news" and they could assume the lease was
"taken care of." (T.T. at 65-66.)
(8)
Lessees never received a payment statementfromColonial Pacific, nor did they
have any other contact with Colonial Pacific for more than two years. (T.T. at 66, 70-71,
(9)
Lessees boxed up the computer equipment and returned it to Bottomline. This
occurred within three weeks afterfirstreceiving the equipment. (T.T. at 64, 77.)
(10) After having no other contact with Colonial Pacific for two years, lessees received
a notice of default for failing to make payments under the lease.
Taken together, the great weight of the evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates that
lessees made a timely rejection of the leased goods. Lessees had the equipment for no more than
three weeks, and were never able to get it to function properly. They seasonably notified Colonial
Pacific to cancel the lease, and promptly returned the equipment to the supplier. Such facts in no
way support afindingof acceptance. Instead, they clearly and convincingly demonstrate that
lessees never accepted the leased goods. As a result, lessees' promise to make payments to
Colonial Pacific was subject to cancellation. Lessees have fully complied with section 70A-2a509(2), which delineates the right of a lessee to reject nonconforming goods. Lessees now
respectfully ask this Court to overturn the trial court's decision.
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G.

Colonial Pacific's Two Year Period of Silence Strongly Suggests the
Company Acquiesced in the Cancellation of the Subject Lease

Lack of acceptance is not the only method by which an irrevocable promise to make
payments under afinancelease agreement can be canceled. Pursuant to section 70A-2a-407(2) of
the Utah Commercial Code, such a promise can also be canceled with the "consent of the party to
whom the promise runs." In the instant case, Colonial Pacific's pattern of silence and inaction for
a period of over two years after lessees failed to make any payments under the lease provides
compelling evidence that the company considered the lease timely revoked, and that it consented
to cancellation of the same. Lessees testified that after three weeks offrustrationand inability to
get the leased equipment to operate properly, they boxed up the equipment and returned it to the
vendor. They further testified that Colonial Pacific told them if they did not receive a payment
booklet, they could assume the lease was taken care of. Colonial Pacific never sent lessees a
payment booklet,2 nor did they have any other contact with lessees for more than two years.
Colonial Pacific's persistent and prolonged pattern of silence and inaction, coupled with its own
statement to lessees that they could assume the lease was taken care of if they did not receive a
payment booklet, leave little doubt that Colonial Pacific consented to cancellation of the lease. If
Colonial Pacific did not consent to the cancellation of the lease, it affirmatively misled lessees into
believing it had so consented, and now stands before this Court with unclean hands. In either
case, this Court should overturn the trial court's decision, and enter a dismissal of this matter with
prejudice.
2

At trial, Colonial Pacific denied that it was responsible for sending a monthly statement to
lessees. Despite that denial, its own documents clearly state that lessees would be receiving a
monthly invoice. Plaintiffs "Lease Processing Sheet," comprising page 3 of Plaintiff s Exhibit #3,
provides: "6. You will be invoiced monthly for $275.88."
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II.

COLONIAL PACIFIC FAILED TO SATISFY A CONDITION
PRECEDENT TO THE LEGAL EFFECTIVENESS OF THE LEASE
AGREEMENT

The trial court erred in concluding, as a matter of law, that the subject lease agreement
was valid and binding under the Utah Commercial Code, because a condition precedent to the
legal effectiveness of the lease had not been satisfied. Lessees were promised a thirty day trial
period within which to test the leased equipment to ensure it was operational and would meet
their needs. During this time, lessees were unable to get the system to operate properly.
Consequently, they boxed up the equipment and returned it to the supplier. They also seasonably
notified Colonial Pacific to stop the lease. For over two years, Colonial Pacific acted as if the
lease had been canceled. Clearly, both parties understood that a condition precedent to the legal
effectiveness of the lease had not been satisfied.
It is well recognized that parol evidence may be offered to show a condition precedent to
the legal effectiveness of a written agreement. As the New York Court of Appeals has stated:
"Parol testimony is admissible to prove a condition precedent to the legal effectiveness of a
written agreement, if the condition precedent does not contradict the express terms of such a
written agreement. A certain disparity is inevitable, of course, whenever a written promise is, by
oral agreement of the parties, made conditional upon an event not expressed in the writing. Quite
obviously, though, the parol evidence rule does not bar proof of every orally established condition
precedent, but only of those which in a real sense contradict the express terms of the written
agreement." Hicks v. Busk 180 N.E.2d 425 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1962) (citations omitted); see also
Long Island Trust Co. v. Internafl Inst., 344 N.E.2d 377 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1976) (parol evidence
admissible to show a condition precedent to enforcement of a written agreement). Utah adheres
16

to this general rule. As the Utah Supreme Court has stated: "[The parol evidence rule] does not
preclude proof of agreements as to collateral matters relating to the contract or its performance,
so long as they are not inconsistent with nor in repudiation of the terms of the written agreement.
Nor does it prevent proof that a party did not perform an obligation which it was understood and
agreed by the parties was a condition precedent to the contract becoming effective.... Whether
there was such a separate agreement, not in contradiction of the written document, is for the trier
of fact to determine." F.M.A. Financial Corp. v. Hansen Dairy. Inc.. 617 P.2d 327, 329 (Utah
1980).
At trial, lessees offered uncontroverted evidence as to the existence of a condition
precedent to the legal effectiveness of the lease, i.e., that they were to have thirty days within
which to test the leased equipment to ensure that it was operational and would meet their needs.
The trial court completely ignored this evidence in rendering a decision, and failed to make any
findings whatsoever as to whether or not all conditions precedent to the legal effectiveness of the
lease were satisfied. This Court shouldfindthat a condition precedent to the legal effectiveness
of the lease was not met, and should therefore overturn the trial court's decision.

CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in upholding the validity of the subjectfinancelease agreement.
Despite overwhelming evidence indicating that lessees timely rejected the lease goods as
nonconforming and defective, the trial court concluded that lessees were irrevocably committed to
making payments under the lease. This conclusion is erroneous as a matter of law, and this Court
should therefore reverse the trial court's decision. The trial court's decision should also be
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reversed because a condition precedent to the legal effectiveness of the lease agreement was not
satisfied. Lessees were promised a thirty day period within which to test the leased goods.
Before the thirty day period expired, lessees boxed up the equipment and returned it to the
supplier They seasonably notified Colonial Pacific of their rejection of the equipment, and were
led to believe they had timely canceled the lease. Colonial Pacific has now obtained a judgment
against lessees in excess of $20,000.00 for a defective 386 computer system that lessees had for
three weeks and were never able to get to operate. Lessees respectfully ask this Court to set that
judgment aside.
DATED this

)°

day of August, 1998.
MORRISON & MORRISON, L.C.

William P. Morrison
Attorney for Appellants
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J. BRUCE READING (USB No. 2700)
SCALLEY Sc READING
Attorney for Defendant
261 East 300 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone:
(001) 531-7870
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
DIVISION II - STATE OF UTAH
COLONIAL PACIFIC LEASING
CORPORATION,

:

ORDER AND JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.

:

J.W.C.J.R. CORPORATION dba
JACK'S SOUTHWEST COLLISION
REPAIR and
JOHN W. CUMBERLEDGE, JR.,
Defendants.

Case No. 970001160
:

Judge William W. Barrett

The above-captioned matter came on for trial before the
Honorable William W. Barrett, Judge of the Third Judicial District
Court, on September 29, 1997, with the Plaintiff represented by and
through

its

attorney

of

record,

J.

Bruce

Reading,

Defendants personally appearing with their attorney of
William P. Morrison.

and

the

record,

The Court, being fully advised, enters the

following Order:
1.

Judgment is awarded in favor of the Plaint Lff and

against the Defendant for Sixteen Thousand Eight Hundred Seventy
Four and 30/100 Dollars ($16,874.30) for the following:

a.

Nine Thousand Six Hundred Forty Two and 83/100

Dollars ($9,642.03) in unpaid finance lease payments; and
b.

Seven

Thousand

Two

Hundred

Thirty

Two

and

12/100 Dollars in accrued interest thereon from the date of default
through the date of judgment at the contractual rate of eighteen
percent (10%) per annum,
2.

aJv*

H

«#-

Plaintiff is awarded reasonable attorney LCCSAJLLI the

amount of Four Thousand

Four Hundred 5*av-eft artd

y&iHtfrtr Dollars

($4,447.30?.
3.

The

total

judgment

awarded

7^* *

by

this

Order

and

^cucKiif-fir^

Judgment is Twenty One Thousand Three Hundred Twenty One and3o/lOO
Dollars ($21,321,60) .
4.
post-judgment

This judgment shall accrue interest at the statutory
interest rate and is subject to augmentation for

costs of collection.
DATED this

day of December, 1997.
BY THE

Willi
Distric
APPROVAL AS TO FORM:

<?/

William P. Morrison
Attorney for Defendants
countK
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bit?-

J.

BRUCLC RL AD 1NG

(USB N o .

2700)

SCALLEY & READING
Attorney for Defendant
261 East 300 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 04111
Telephone:
(001) LTJ1-7070
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
DIVISION II - STATE OK UTAH
COLONIAL PACIFIC LEASING
CORPORATION,

;

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.

:

J.W.C.J.R. CORPORATION dba
JACK'S SOUTHWEST COLLISION
REPAIR and
JOHN W. CUMBERLEDGE, JR.,
Defendants.

Case No. 9700011.00
:

Judge William W

Barrett

The abovc-captioned matter came on for trial before the
Honorable William W. Barrett, Judge of the Third Judicial District
Court, on September 29, 1997, with the Plaintiff represented by and
through

its

attorney

of

record,

J.

Bruce

Readuig,

Defendants personally appearing with their attorney of
William P. Morrison.

and

the

rocord,

The Court hereby enters the Loll owing:
FINDINGS OF FACT

1.

Defendant J.W.C.J.R. Corporation dba Jack'.*;

Southwest Collision Repair and Plaintiff Colonial Pacific Leasing
Corporation entered into a valid and binding lease contract on
June 9, 1993.

20

Defendant John W. Cumberledge, Jr. signed a

written guarantee of Defendant J.W.C.J.R.'s lease contract with
Plaintiff on June 9, 1993.
3.

Defendant J.W.C.J.R. used Plaintiff's financing to

procure computer equipment from Bottomline Systems, Inc.
4.

The equipment was delivered and installed at

Defendant J.W.C.J.R.'s place of business by Bottomline Systems,
Inc., but it did not function properly.
5.

Defendant John Cumberledge informed Plaintiff on

two occasions that the equipment was not operational.
6.

The equipment was returned to Bottomline Systems,

Inc. subsequent to the signing and execution of the finance
lease.
7.

The Defendants were not contacted by Plaintiff

until approximately two years thereafter, at which time Plaintiff
sought payment in full from Defendants.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Defendants entered into a valid and binding

lease contract with Plaintiff.
2.

The lease contract is governed by the provisions

of the Utah Commercial Code wherein it is categorized as a
finance lease.
3.

The Defendants failed to uphold their duty to

comply with the terms of the finance lease.

4.

The Defendants' failure to make payments to

Plaintiff pursuant to the finance lease constituted a breach of
contract.
5.

Based upon the Defendants' breach, Plaintiff

should be awarded judgment in the amount of Sixteen Thousand
Eight Hundred Seventy Four and no/100 Dollars ($16,074.00),
together with reasonable attorney's fees, post-judgment interest,
and associated costs of collection.
DATED this

day of December, 1997.
BY THE COURT:

William W. Barrett
District Court Judge
APPROVAL AS TO FORM:

William P. Morrison
Attorney for Defendants
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[12]

This appeal involves the sale of a computer system to a
construction company. After receiving what it considered to
be inadequate training in the use of the system, the
construction company sued the seller in the Circuit Court for
Lincoln County seeking recovery of the purchase price and
damages. Following a bench trial, the trial court awarded the
construction company $32,909 in compensatory damages and
attorneys fees. The seller has appealed, asserting that the
construction company did not effectively reject the system.
disagree and affirm the trial court
I.

[13]

Highland Rim Constructors ("Highland Rim") is a commercial
construction company located in Fayetteville, Tennessee. In
late 1988, Ronnie Wallace, the company's owner, decided to
purchase a computer system to help stay abreast with the
growth in his business. Even though Mr. Wallace had no prior
experience with computers, several of his employees assured
him that a computer system would be beneficial

[14]

Highland Rim sought proposalsfromseveral vendors and, on
January 31,1989, entered into a "system purchase and
software license agreementw with Atlantic Software
Corporation ("Atlantic"), a Colorado corporation with an
office in nearby Huntsville, Alabama. The agreement required
Atlantic to supply Highland Rim not only with the hardware
and software for the system but also with sixty hours of
on-site training. In addition, the agreement required lull
payment before the training took place and contained the
following "money-back purchase guarantee:"

[15]

If you are not satisfied with our products within 30 days
after attending the classroom training at our offices, your
complete system can be returned for a full refund of the "Net
Computer System Purchase Price" only. This is applicable only
if Atlantic had been paid in full for the system as detailed
above and if the system is returned to our office in
"like-new" conditioa "Guarantee is UNAVAILABLE if Customer
chooses to "Lease" computer system.

[16]

The hardware and software were delivered on February 21,
1989, and Highland Rim paid the full $22,000 purchase price

at that time.
[17]

Atlantic hired Rhett Leake, an independent trainer it had
used on other installations, to provide the training for
Highland Rim's employees. Mr. Leake was already familiar with
the system, and his only instructions were to schedule as
many training days per week as possible and to complete the
training as quickly as he could

[18]

The training began on February 27,1989 but did not proceed
very satisfactorily. Highland Rim's employees did not like
Mr. Leake's training methods, and the training sessions were
sporadic and ineffectual because of scheduling problems and
other interruptions caused by the employees' work. By the
time Mr. Leak conducted his last training session on June 12,
1989, he had provided only 57.5 hours oftraining, and
Highland Rim's employees were able to operate only one of the
nine software applications.

[19]

The slowness and ineffectiveness of the training infuriated
Mr. Wallace. He summoned James L, Wiggins, Atlantic's
Southeast Regional Sales Manager to his office on July 7,
1989 and bluntly informed him that he had lost faith in
Atlantic and that he wanted his money back. Mr. Wiggins
stated that he did not have authority to authorize a refund.
However, he told Mr. Wallace that he would try to arrange for
Mr. Wallace to meet with James A, Howell, Atlantic's
president, who was planning to be in the area during the
following week.

[20]

The meeting never occurred, and Mr. Wallace's repeated
telephone calls to Mr. Howell went unanswered. This further
upset Mr. Wallace, and on August 9,1989, Highland Rim's
office manager warned Atlantic that "suit will be filed"
unless Mr. Howell returned Mr. Wallace's telephone call by
August 11,1989.

[21]

Mr. Howell did not return Mr. Wallace's telephone call.
Instead, his wife, who was Atlantic's operations manager,
sent Mr. Wallace two letters. Thefirst,dated August 10,
1989, offered additional training at no cost in Denver or in
Fayetteville as long as Highland Rim would agree to pay the
trainer's expenses in advance. The second, dated August 11,
1989, informed Mr. Wallace that he had not properly exercised
hisrightsunder the money-back purchase guarantee and that
Atlantic intended to pursue counterclaims ifhe proceeded
with his "frivolous lawsuit"

[22]

Approximately one month after Atlantic's last letter,
Highland Rim sued Atlantic, alleging that it had breached the
agreement and had made negligent misrepresentations by
failing "to provide the essential support training and
support elements of the contract" The trial court heard the
case without a jury on October 9,1990 and awarded Highland
Rim $22,000 in compensatory damages and $10,909 in attorneys
fees.

[23]

n.

[24]

This case involves a hybrid agreement requiring Atlantic to
supply Highland Rim with both goods and services. Since
Article 2 applies only to "transactions in goods," Tenn. Code
Ann. 47-2-102 (1979), we must first determine whether
Atlantic's sale of an integrated computer system to Highland
Rim is a transaction in goods.

[25]

Courts employ the "predominant element test" to determine
whether a hybrid contract involves a transaction in goods.
The test requires the courts to view the transaction in its
entirety and to identify the most significant element of the
transaction. See Hudson v. Town & Country True Value

Hardware, Inc., 666 S.W.2d 51,53 (Tenn. 1984). Ifthe sale
of goods predominates, and the services are only incidental,
then the agreement involves a transaction in goods and is
governed by Article 2.1 Ronald A. Anderson, Uniform
Commercial Code 2-105:38(1981).
[26]

Other courts, using the predominant element test, have found
that contracts for the sale of computer systems or related
components, including hardware, software, training, and
support services, are contracts for the sale of goods
governed by Article 2„ RRX Indus., Inc. v. Lab-Con, Inc., 772
F.2d 543,546 (9th Cir, 1985) (software, training, systems
repairs, and upgrades); Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v.
Honeywell, Inc., 604 F.2d 737,742-43 (2d Cir. 1979)
(hardware and software); Nelson Business Equip. Ctr., Inc. v.
Monteleone, 524 A.2d 1172,1174 (Del 1987) (computer
system); USM Corp. v. Arthur D. Little Sys., Inc., 546 N.E.2d
888,894 (Mass. App. Ct 1989) (computer system);
Communications Group, Inc. v. Warner Communications, Inc.,
527 N.Y.S.2d 341,344 (N.Y. Civ. Ct 1988) (software); Camara
v. Hill, 596 A.2d 349,351 (Vt 1991) (computer system).

[27]

We agree with the reasoning of these precedents. Atlantic's
agreement with Highland Rim was predominantly for the sale of
an integrated computer system. Its obligation to provide
training in the use of the system was incidental to the
purchase ofthe system itself. Accordingly, the transaction
is one involving goods, and the parties' rights and remedies
are governed by Article 2.

[28]

m.

[29]

A buyer must either accept or reject goods within a
reasonable tlnig alia1 UitftrJender or delivery, I. N. Price
Co. v. Hamilton Produce Co., 8 Tenn. Civ! App. (Higgins) 467,
470 (1918); Tenn. Code Ana 47-2-602(1) -606(l)(b) (1979),
but acceptance cannot occur until the buyer hashada
reasonaoie"opportunity to inspect the goods. Tenn. Code Ann.
I
47-2-606(1). The reasonableness ot the opportunity to
t depends upon the nature ofthe goods and the terms of
rtransaction. See Moses v. Newman, 658 S.W.2d 119,121
\ I (Tenn. Ct App. 1983).
[30]

The parties may define their own reasonable time periods by
agfranent Tenn. Code Ana 47-1-204(1) (14)79). Inlffis ~~
case, the money-back purchase guarantee contains just such an
agreementgWhen read in light ofthe parties' agreement to
provide on-site training in Fayetteville the guarantee
permits Highland Rim to accept or reject the entire system
within thirty days after the completion of the training. \

[31]

Paying for the goods after they have been tendered or
delivered is one circumstance tending to signify acceptance
ofthe goods. Tenn. Code Ann. 47-2-606 comment 3. It is
not, however, a conclusive circumstance, especially when the
transaction involves goods whose non-conformities can only be
discovered after installation and use. United Airlines, Inc.
v. Conductron Corp., 387 N.E.2d 1272,1282 (I1L App. Ct
1979); Tonka Tours, Inc. v. Chadima, 372 N.W.2d 723,727
(Minn. 1985). As the Supreme Court of Montana has noted:

[32]

A court must be realistic in appraising the sufficiency of a
buyer's opportunity to inspect andshould not hold that the
fijryer hqs aqcfipM wlipnrharJTisg-of the technical or complex
nature of the goods the buyer cannot determine whether they
are satisfactory until he actually makes use of them.

~^

[33]
[34]

Steinmetz v. Robertas, 637 P.2d 31,36 (Mont 1981).
The agreement required Highland Rim to pay for the entire
computer system when the hardware was delivered, even before

the software was installed or the users trained. The system
was sufficiently complex that Highland Rim could not have
determined whether it was satisfactory until after it had a
chance to use it Thus, Highland Rim's payment and use of the
system prior to July 7,1989, do not amount to acceptance of
the system.
[35]

The buyer must give the seller seasonable notice inorder to
reject the goods, l^na Cffite7$nnT47-2-602( 1). The notice
*need not be uTwrm^and need not Be couchedlh any special
terms, it is adequagg it reasoiiabTy Ihfomi^the ogig; ~~
party that the transaction is claimed to mvolve a_breach.
TenoCode A5ttT47-l-201(26), -20f(27) (Supp. 1991) and
Tena Code Ann. 47-2-607 comment 4 (1979).

[36]

Highland Rim effectivelyrejectedAtlantic's computer system
on July 7,1989, when Mr. Wallace informed Mr. Wiggins of his
dissatisfaction with the computer system because of the
inadequacy of the training. The conversation occurred within _
thirty days after the last day of training and could have
left no doubt in Mr. Wiggins' mind that Mr>_Wallac&bdIeved
that Atlantic had breached the agreement and that he had
decided to cancel the contract
"^^-———-——

[37]

IV.

[38]

Even if Highland Rim's notice was within the time provided
for in the parties' agreement Atlantic insists that it was
not effective because Highland Rim did not give Atlantic a
reasonable opportunity to cure. Article 2 provides sellers an
opportunity to cure a nonconforming tender when the time for
performance has not expired, Tena Code Ana 47-2-508(1)
(1979), or when the seller has grounds to believe that its
tender would be acceptable. Tena Code Ana 47-2-508(2).
Atlantic's purported tender satisfies neither requirement

[39]

Atlantic's money-back purchase guarantee provided that the
time for Atlantic to perform under the contract expired
thirty days after the completion of the training. It also
gave Highland Rim the unrestrictedrightto reject the system
and to cancel the contract within the thirty-day period
withoutfirstgiving Atlantic an opportunity to cure.
Therefore, Atlantic contracted away its opportunity to cure
if Highland Rim rejected the system within thirty days after
the completion of training.

[40]

From the very beginning of its dealings with Highland Rim,
Atlantic knew that its customer placed a high priority on
training. Highland Rim insisted on contracting for more
training than Atlantic believed was necessary and also
insisted that the training take place in its own offices in
Fayetteville rather than in Denver. Thus, for the purposes of
Tena Code Ana 47-2-508(2), Atlantic had no reasonable
grounds to believe that the type of sporadic, ineffectual
training it actually provided would be acceptable to Highland
Rim.

[41]

In any event, Atlantic's August 10,1989 offer to provide
additional training was not a reasonable offer to cure.
Atlantic knew that off-site training in Denver would not be
acceptable to Highland Rim because Highland Rim had insisted
on on-site training In the past Atlantic's offer to provide
additional on-site training was likewise ineffectual because
it would have required Highland Rim to incur more expenses
man it had contracted for. An offer to cure that increases
the cost to the buyer is not an effective offer.

[42]
[43]

V.
Even if Highland Rim effectively rejected the computer
system, Atlantic also asserts that Highland Rim's remedies

were limited by the agreement and that Highland Rim was not
entitled to pursue even its limited remedies because it kept
and used the system after giving its notice of rejection. We
have determined that Highland Rim had available the full
panoply of Article 2 remedies and that requiring Highland Rim
to give up its security interest in the goods in order to
obtain a refund unconscionably conflicts with Article 2.
[44]

Buyers who reject nonconforming goods may agree to limit
their Article 2 remedies as long as the agreement is not
unconscionable. However, agreements providing for remedies in
addition to or in substitution for those provided in Article
2 will be considered optional unless they are "expressly
agreed to be exclusive," Tena Code Ana 47-2-719(l)(b)
(1979). Since the remedy in Atlantic's money-back purchase
guarantee was not expressly exclusive, it was not Highland
Rim's sole remedy.

[45]

A buyer may reject goods that do not conform to the contract
Tena Code Ann. 47-2-601(a) (1979). Following an effective
rejection, the buyer may cancel the contract and recover so
much ofthe purchase price as has been paid *ml Tenn. Code
Ann. 47-2-711(1) (19791; True v. J. B. Deeds & Sons, 151
Tenn. 630,635-36,271 S.W. 41,42 (1925); Patton v. McHone,
822 S.W.2d 608,618 (Tenn. CL App. 1991).

[46]

Buyers who reject goods may, depending on the circumstances,
store the rejected goods, ship them back to the seller, or
resell them for the seller's account Term. Code Ana
47-2-604 (1979). If the buyer has paid any portion ofthe
purchase price, it has a security interest in the goods and
may retain them in order to perfect its security interest
Tena Code Ana 47-2-711(3). Retaining goods when a buyer
has a security interest in them is not an act inconsistent
with the seller's ownership under Tena Code Ana
47-2-606(lXc) (1979). 3 William D. Hawkland, Uniform
Commercial Code Series 2-711:03(1984).

[47]

In certain circumstances, buyers with a security interest in
rejected goods may also continue to use the goods in a
reasonable manner without being deemed to have re-accepted
them Alden Press, Inc. v. Block & Co., 527 N.E.2d 489,495
(111. Ct App. 1988); McCuiiough v. Bill Swad
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 449 N.E.2d 1289,1292 (Ohio 1983).
Yates v. Clifford Motors, Inc., 423 A.2d 1262,1271-72 (Pa.
Super. Ct 1980). But if they continue to use the goods, they
should be made to pay the fair value for their usefromthe
time of their rejection. See Moore v. Howard
Pontiac-American, Inc., 492 S.W.2d 227,230 (Tena Ct App.
1972); 1 James J. White & Robert S. Summers, Uniform
Commercial Code 8-3, at 413-14 (3d ed. 1988) ("White &
Summers"); 4 Ronald A. Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code
2-715:21 (1983).

[48]

It is not commercially reasonable to require a buyer to give
up its Tena Code Ana 47-2-711(3) security interest in
goods in return for a less certain prospect of a refund of
the purchase price. Therefore, Atlantic's money-back purchase
guarantee was unenforceable to the extent that it attempted
to force Highland Rim to give up its security interest in the
goods.

[49]

When Mr. Wallace notified Mr. Wiggins on July 7,1989 that he
was rejecting the goods and canceling the contract, Mr.
Wiggins declined to give him directions concerning the return
of the system. In fact, Atlantic later insisted that Highland
Rim had norightsunder the money-back purchase guarantee.
Highland Rim's failure to return the goods does not undermine
the validity of its rejection.

[50]

Since Highland Rim continued to use the computer system after

rejecting it and canceling the contract, Atlantic would have
been entitled to offset the purchase price by the fair value
of Highland Rim's use ofthe system. However, the burden of
proof of the amount of this offset was on Atlantic. White &
Summers, (supra), 8-3, at 414. Since Atlantic introduced
no proof concerning the fair value of Highland Rim's limited
use of the computer system it is not entitled to an offset
now.
[51]
[52]

VL
We affirm the judgment and remand the case to the trial court
for whatever other proceedings may be required We also tax
the costs to the Atlantic Software Corporation and its surety
for which execution, if necessary, may issue.

[53]

WILLIAM C.KOCH, JR., JUDGE

[54]

CONCUR:

[55]

HENRY F. TODD, PRESIDING JUDGE

[56]

SAMUEL L. LEWIS, JUDGE

Opinion Footnotes

[57]

*ml Buyers are also entitled to incidental and consequential
damages under Tenn. Code Ana 47-2-715 (1979). The trial
court did not award these damages in this case, apparently
because Highland Rim's proof was too speculative. Highland
Rim has not appealedfromthe denial of consequential
damages; therefore, this issue is not before us.
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